

GOALS AND PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT
An Integrated View

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1. Development: a bird's eye view.

To divide the world into West and East, and then into North and South, trying to persuade us that there is an East-West conflict and a North-South dialogue going on, does not yield much insight and does not even stand up against a little study of the map of our world. But if we use both divisions at the same time a surprisingly fruitful division of the world emerges into four worlds of development:

Table 1. Four worlds of development

	WEST	EAST
NORTH	<u>First world:</u> Private capitalism OECD countries	<u>Second world:</u> State socialism CMEA countries
SOUTH	<u>Third world:</u> NIEO South America, Caribbean Africa, Arab World, West Asia, South Asia	<u>Fourth world:</u> Ichi-ban Japan, China, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand

In dividing the world this way some positions are made explicit:

- there is no "North" as an actor, the capitalist and the socialist parts are different and enter in different ways in relation to the Third world
- there is no "South" as an actor either; the countries in East and Southeast Asia, particularly the mini-Japans [Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore] are both quite rich and industrialized and enter the world more like Japan. China and other countries in this region also fit better into this picture, particularly in the slightly longer run, than in any other major grouping.
- there is no "North"- "South" conflict but certainly a major economic conflict between the world Northwest and the world Southeast, and a major conflict over dependency in general between the world Northwest and the world Southwest. The idea of a North-South conflict mystifies world reality.
- there is no "East-West" conflict, but certainly a major political conflict between the world Northwest and the world Northeast.

Thus, the world Northwest, the rich private capitalist countries, emerge as the pivot element in the conflicts: a conflict over basic economic restructuring of the world with the world Southwest, the Third world; a conflict of increasingly sharp economic competition with the world Southeast; and a conflict that may erupt in a major military confrontation with the world Northeast.

These three conflicts are certainly not unrelated. The common root is the structure imposed upon national and global economies by the projet of the First world: private capitalism. The other three worlds are dialectic reactions to this structure, centered in the First world, rooted in particular aspects of Occidental cosmology. The first reaction, historically, is found in the Second world, headed and dominated by the Soviet Union, partly withdrawing from the system in an effort to build an alternative projet: state socialism. The second reaction is found in the Third world, with their projet, the New International Economic Order, essentially an effort to become subjects and not only objects on the global market by imitating nationally some of the aspects of either or both of the first and second worlds. And the third reaction [although Japan certainly precedes the other two] is found in the Fourth world, in an effort to play the game of world capitalism better than the first world, outdoing them at their own game thereby becoming No. 1 - ichi-ban.

It is my contention that the Fourth world will or have already succeeded in this, but not only because of their own skills in playing the game, also because of the weakening of the First world through the conflict and arms race [and general militarization] with the **S**econd world, the limits to exploitation of the Third world, the limits to exploitation of their own inner proletariat and to the exploitation of nature. Historically important was, of course, the OPEC action of 1973 leading up to the institutionalization of the NIEO. But the OPEC countries became rich the wrong way, by possessing and not through processing and hard work, and for that reason will hardly play a lasting role in the world economy. [In addition, the Islamic strictures on interest and the fact that most OPEC countries are Islamic, will probably make it almost impossible to proceed from commercial to industrial capitalism - and then there is also the lack of organizational infrastructure]. The Newly Industrializing Countries [NICs] includes

also some countries in the Third, Second and First worlds, but they hardly constitute a threat to Fourth world countries in the struggle for global economic hegemony as industrial suppliers.

These three major world conflicts, obscured by artificial East/West and North/South borderlines will continue to evolve and interact in ways that are difficult to predict, particularly as a new structural conflict around the increasing dependency of the Third world on the Fourth world is also taking shape. Just as the biggest country in the Fourth world, China, manages to liberate itself from the Second world the Third world may also increasingly manage to liberate itself from the First. The efforts of the First world to find major and reliable allies in the other world [with Second world as a "North" in order to share the burdens of a more equitable world order demanded by the "South"; with the Third world as a defense against "communism" in the concept of the "Free World"; with the Fourth world as a Trilateral in order to manage world capitalism] are probably all bound to fail. In fact, the First world is probably slated to suffer economic defeat in the competition with the Fourth world, to suffer political defeat in its effort to continue to manipulate the Third world and may also suffer military defeat in a confrontation with the Second world - not because the Second world has more effective destructive power, but because the First world is more vulnerable.

In the shorter run the economic decline of the First world [low or negative growth rates, unemployment and inflation, decreasing market shares] will continue, as will the economic growth of the Fourth world and the stagnation of the other two worlds - with some exceptions. The Fourth world will be protected by relatively good distribution of richness, the other three will all be headed for internal revolts because of increasingly unequal distributions as the economies get tighter - particularly in the more conservative of the First world countries.

2. Development: the social space.

Why does all of this happen? Somehow it is "development" at work, a term to be criticized later, here to be used essentially as a synonym for "modernization" or "nation-building". Regardless of how the term is conceived of there would be agreement that some kind of social change is involved, and since social change is politics and politics is about power, development is an exercise of and in power. The following is a sketch of a general theory of that exercise.

The theory would start with the three types of power, the power of ideas, of the carrot and of the stick - or more seriously expressed: normative, remunerative and coercive power. By and large I will stand by the thesis that developmentalism as a major trend, and a world trend at that, concretizes these three aspects of power in the following way; with only minor variations [except in the relative presence of these components] from one of the four worlds of development to the other:

Normative power: deriving from the goal of bourgeois way of life:

- non-manual work; avoiding the dirty and heavy
- material comfort; controlling nature's fluctuations
- privatism; withdrawal into family and peer groups
- security; a pattern of lasting entitlements

Remunerative power deriving from a structure providing goods/services:

- state-articulation, bureaucracies with national plans
- capital-articulation, corporations, national markets
- intelligentsia/professional articulation, for both

Coercive power: deriving from a structure providing force and pain:

- police, for intra-national force
- military, for inter-national force
- party, for legitimation of force


They will be referred to as the BWL[syndrome], the BCI [complex] and the PMP [complex] respectively. "Development", then, is the problem of articulation of all three at the national level, and integrated with each other. Of course, power of all three types there has always been and will always be. But in "traditional" societies the goal was defined by religion, to a large extent; the plans were drawn up at the [extended] family level, the market was

the village market; people were their own intelligentsia; police and military there were but the former for the outside and the latter local, not both operating at the national level.

Clearly, to the extent this is a correct picture "development" entails an enormous concentration of power at the national level with the goal-setting becoming a national ideology of adequate standard of material living, for all; national plans and markets providing goods and services and the PMP complex pushing where BWL and BCI provide and insufficient pull. This concentration of power takes place in what is here called the "social" space, meaning by that the country, or [wrongly] the "nation". But there are also other space: the human [or inner, the local, the global and the outer [nature]]. When there was a low level of plan and market at the national level this does not mean there were no plans and markets, but they were at the local level. National articulation would generally imply local disarticulation, at least in relative terms; although processes whereby both national and local levels of power increase together are not inconceivable.

If we now take national plan and market articulation as the key aspects of development of social space the four worlds of development can be relatively well fitted in:

Figure 2. Development as plan and market articulation, nationally



In this Figure the First and Second worlds are seen as engaged in their exercises of market and plan articulation, respectively; building very strong corporations and very strong bureaucracies for the distribution of goods and services. However, it is well known that even if in the Soviet Union State is much stronger than Capital and in the United States Capital is much stronger than State [meaning "state" in the sense of provider of goods and services, not in the sense of an instrument of coercion, in many countries they are more equal. Some of those countries are called social democracies for various historical reasons. They have been placed here on the compromise line $S+C = \text{constant}$; seen from the Soviet Union they look capitalist, seen from the United States they look socialist. In these countries the provision for goods and services is mixed; partly by plan, partly by market; partly with Bureaucracy as the provider, partly with the Corporation [the modern articulation of the company/firm/enterprise]. Mixed economies also have to be negotiation economies, implying a lot of negotiations between state and capital to find workable compromises when one does not automatically have the upper hand over the other.

Some time ago there was the famous convergence thesis, that the first and the second world would somehow have to meet in the middle, in the social democrat First and a half world. But even if there is much to say in favor of the Northwest European welfare states relative to many other systems in the world as a normative model, this does not mean that in the historical process, concretely, the first and second world would ever meet there. Trajectories in the space of Figure 2 may be much more complex, and there is certainly no clear Endzustand, final stage. For one thing: even if some of the First world is there rather than in the corner [the corner is where the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, respectively, try to place the US and the UK for the time being], it may move to other places before the Second world arrives there by introducing

more market articulation through an expanding private sector.

This thing called "development", then, seems to be to drag Third world countries with a very weak national level super-structure from the corner where they were, traditionally [as we were all of us], and up to some place on that diagonal - from the Green corner to the Blue corner if they get US/First world "assistance"; to the Red corner if they get SU/Second world "assistance", and towards the Rose segment in-between if they get "assistance" from such 'First and a half' countries as Yugoslavia or Norway. As all these countries are members of the United Nations it is not so easy for the UN to engage in development assistance without being a party to one world or the other; a problem often solved by sticking to fundamentals on which there is sufficient consensus [provision for material basic needs and for basic administrative infrastructure].

In short, "development" is a way in which certain countries, strongly articulated at the national level, reproduce themselves. Why they do it can be discussed [to have allies in the world space, to validate their own system, to penetrate better in something shaped the way they know and master, out of solidarity with the poor and repressed]; whatever one's judgment it is clear that this is the only thing they can do because it is the only thing they know how to do. There is a broad consensus that to be modern, developed one has to be somewhere on that diagonal.

A broad consensus, yes, but with three rather major exceptions.

The first is found among the defectors from that line, the green wave of people disenchanted with too much plan and/or market articulation, groping for systems more rooted in the local level, in family and peers, and in what is held to be true human needs. At the same time as there is an effort to push and pull Third world countries up towards some landing place on that diagonal many people

in countries that have arrived try to leave. They can only move, trying to invigorate local levels [collectives for production and/or consumption in First world countries, self-managed trade unions and even enterprises in Second world countries] to the extent that they are free to move - and this freedom, for reasons to be discussed below, seems at present best [only?] available in the Rose segment, the First and a half world countries. All together this creates a highly contradictory picture of the whole process: why try to arrive if those who have arrived try to leave - - - Convergence, again!

And that is the second exception. There are those in the Third world who are firmly rooted in the Green pole of development as not only the most realistic, but also the most desirable. Like all these ways of conceiving of development the ideological formulation may be more fundamentalist than really intended. There would be a state, even some state planning at the national level, but the point of gravity would be at the local level. Clearly, what liberalism has meant for the blue pole of development, and marxism, for the red pole, gandhism and maoism (and anarchism in general) are for the green pole - those two giant theories of development coming out of the Third world itself (before China could be - and better I think - classified as part of the Fourth world).

And then there is the third exception: the yellow pole of development, with Japan as the supreme exemplar, with an unwritten ideology that can only be referred to as "japanism" - but clearly succesful, clearly concerned with development however defined, and clearly different from the others among other things because of the way in which state and capital, plan and market etc. seem to go hand in hand.

So we end up with six or seven theories of development, three [liberalism, social democracy, marxism] along one diagonal,

and three (or four - gandhism/anarchism/maoism and japanism) along the other. Of course, practice differs and will always have to differ from theory - no reasonably coherent body of social thought can ever mirror complex and contradictory social reality without making a travesty of it.

And yet it is useful to think in terms of these five colors or six, seven theories. There is so much human aspiration and dream, and so much genuine endeavour to come to grips with the human condition in general and the development problématique in particular embedded in them! And exactly for that reason one wonders whether they really exclude each other or whether they are not also expressions of social and intellectual polarization; of one group embracing one ideology put forward by one intellectual who is then contradicted by another intellectual putting forward his theory (usually "his", women seem to be less interested in such verbal games) which is then embraced by a group with interests seen as contradictory to the first group. And so on, and so forth.

But if that is the case the search for viable combinations might be interesting, seeing the polarization as due to the theory process rather than as due to any deeper social process. If we use the two axes of Figure 2, capital-articulation and state-articulation, as the two basic ideological vectors in this effort to theorize about social space, then the ideologies or theories along the main diagonal, from green to yellow, are already eclectic - including the rose one. On this diagonal $S = C$; the question is how high one wants $S + C$ to be, minimum as in the green solution, in-between as in the rose solution, or maximum as in the yellow solution?

My own predilection would be in favor of something between green and rose as that would yield the society with the highest level of complexity, with both local, state and capital articulation.

Ecology informs us of the significance of the maturity of a system, based on its diversity and the symbiosis among the elements. At this level of reasoning there would be at least three major roots for development of the social space [the green, the blue and the red] - not only one as in the corners [or two as in the yellow, fourth world, Japanese corner]. Such systems have higher resilience. Should one pillar fail, there are still two; and relations can be spun in all directions. Systems based on only capital/market articulation or only state/plan articulation become too vulnerable: if the pillar fails everything fails and all kinds of maldevelopment will be the result at all levels - as witnessed relatively clearly today in the absurd aspects of the major blue and red societies: the United States and the Soviet Union. There may be other reasons as well, but at this point the complexity argument alone should carry some weight.

There is an interesting difference between the main diagonal and the bi-diagonal of Figure 2. The latter coincides with the spectrum of political parties known from the West, in the tradition where favoring strong capital and weak state is seen as a "rightist" position, whereas favoring a strong state and weak capital is seen as a "leftist" position, even a progressive position because the state is seen as the possible protector of the victims of capital - the working class [consult Polish workers on that idea]. A concrete consequence of this is that so much of the political discussion in the world is a reflection of a division into parties along a political axis that takes in only some alternatives, and only from the recent social history of some parts of the world. The focus on the bi-diagonal obscures, even reduces the whole development dialogue to an unrealistic and ethnocentric simplification shared by liberal and marxist thinkers alike - both of them hostile to the "archaic" green pole, to the eclectic, non-pure rose pole and both ignorant and confused about the yellow pole. It is high time to broaden that dialogue.

Let us now make this more complex by exploring more the other two types of power: normative and coercive, not only the structure built to provide for goods and services, making people comply as producers as otherwise they would not qualify as consumers. To expand a little on Marx: a basic key to power is to own means of production (not necessarily individually, but as a class, capitalist or bureaucrat or both) so that one can say: produce on our conditions or else! (starve to death), because you will not gain what you need to consume. Do ut des, quid pro quo.

But people have to want to consume that which they produce. They have to want the goods and services produced, not other goods and services; leaving alone that they should not be able to produce in any other way than that articulated by B and C and their helpers in the intelligentsia. The promulgation of BWL serves this purpose under the second point, "material comfort". There is the problem of how to produce all these material goods when non-manual work is also promised: the contradiction presumably resolved through very high productivity and automation, at the expense of those in other worlds who still have to engage in manual work. The need for services is assured under the third and fourth points: privatism means withdrawal from the local level into a micro space that cannot possibly supply neither goods nor all the services ("love and tendercare" may be, but not medical care and schooling), Hence the local level is left in vacuo, and the national level is emerging as having a monopoly on essential services. Local economic (goods and services) cycles are broken up, the cycles expand and become national, spun through B and/or C. The state, not the local level and not even capital, is seen as the ultimate guarantor of security - not only in the limited sense of protection against violence, but in the sense of social security, lasting provision for basic needs, the famous security net.

But the BWL ideology is not all that is needed in terms

normative power. One has to accept the structural solution too. So let us for a moment agree with conventional wisdom and see the green pole not as one approach to development but simply lack of development, a green country being a country that is undeveloped or underdeveloped [relative to its capacity]. In this country we now insert processes of capital and/or state articulation, markets and/or plans. A simple but rather important proposition from sociology now becomes useful: people comply best when they want to do what they have to do, in other words when basic values underlying social structures are internalized, meaning that they have become personal values. And it is easily seen what these key values would be:

for the market: competition, among producers to be the best sellers, among consumers to be the best buyers

for the plan: rationality, at the social level, and at the individual level to accept the "best" social solutions

for bureaucracy and corporation: discipline, respect for authority, and belief in the authority that be as the best possible.

These three values already serve as a basis for understanding why the green and the yellow are poles apart. Most anarchist philosophies/ideologies would stress cooperation rather than competition, participation rather than plan (from above), and solidarity rather than discipline (instead of discipline ^{one} might also say loyalty above - meaning vertical discipline as opposed to the horizontal discipline of solidarity). In Japan, on the other hand all three values above are well internalized, it seems. Discipline is found both in the form of loyalty to state and nation in general [shinto], respect for authority [confucianism] and solidarity with others [buddhism]. Competition and rationality were always there, in the bushido tradition, but can also be seen as parts of the occidentlization of Japan, as values or orientations added to what was already there. It is the value richness that makes it so possible for Japan to engage in such a rich development process,

But few systems have this value density. In the Occident; for instance, it took long time to bend Christianity [originally a religion highly compatible with green values] so that a good Christian would serve the state [Emperor Constantin, Roman Empire] and/or capital [Calvin?]. To ensure that one does what one has to do even if one does not want to do it, social control (a euphemism for force) is needed, not the carrot of products if one produces in the prescribed manner (as slave, serf, worker), but the stick of pain inflicted. Basic values insufficiently internalized have to be institutionalized. And thus the history of development also becomes the history of coercion, force, violence: both the coercion needed to keep a system in a certain region in the space of development (Figure 2), the coercion needed to move it (breaking down the structures that upheld the preceding pattern, for instance) and the coercion needed to settle in a new region. Each formation serves the interests of some groups more than others and in general one would expect the overprivileged to resist and the underprivileged to promote a change.

Is any world of development more inherently repressive than the others? Empirical studies may certainly give correlations between location of a country (according to Table 1) and level of repression. But methodologically they may be difficult to interpret. Is the repression a part of the formation or is it a reaction to efforts to alter status quo, from within and/or without? Or is it an effort to alter the status quo in and by itself, a formation on the way to something else? The safest position to take on this issue is probably that any system can be found with or without high levels of repression, with or without the brown element, so to speak. Thus, feudalism was to a large extent repression exercised over fragmented, relatively self-sufficient local communities. The transition to capitalism presupposed some opening of cycles of local self-sufficiency, forcing labor into nation-

al labor markets (plantations, for instance, to pay taxes with cash), imposing a national capital market through monetization of as much as possible of the economy, then supplying goods and services centrally in that monetized economy. The green economy, with production for own consumption, or for barter, or for monetized exchange but then in very small economic cycles decreases in size and significance as the blue economy takes over. Force is needed, and is used.

This is also true of the transition to socialism. The marxist hypothesis is that it will take place above all in mature capitalist economies where capital and market are fully articulated, by inverting the structural dictatorship of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat into a direct dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, and then the state as repression withers away. However:

- the revolution takes place not in mature but in semi-articulated capitalist societies
- it may also take place in feudal societies, "by-passing capitalism"
- the dictatorship is not so much by the proletariat as by the PMP complex, and not so much over the bourgeoisie as [1] over the peasants to see to it that they continue delivering food-stuffs, [2] over intellectuals to see to it that they become a serving intelligentsia and [3] over workers to see to it that they continue producing the goods at low costs
- the state does not quite wither away but solidifies as a setting both for the PMP complex and the BCI complex, B in the sense of planning and C in the sense of production of goods and services, I in the sense of professionals.

Evidently, there are some problems with marxist theory. But it is far superior from liberal theory which only sees continued and cumulative articulation of capital, with ever more production, turnover and accumulation. Marxism at least has a history with the discontinuities we know from history. The difficulty is the way in which it presupposes a linear sequence; in our terms:

green [feudalism] - blue [capitalism] - red [socialism] - green [communism], where the transition from socialism to communism seems to consist in first a withering away of the state as instrument of repression, then also (?) as instrument of centralized planning, opening for smaller and self-reliant communities (hence commune-ism).

From the position that repressive structures may be found anywhere it does not follow that they are equally likely anywhere. A non-repressive structure is one that gives people a chance to participate, to have not only a say but even the final word, meaning that the authorities are ultimately accountable to the people [to whom they are an authority]. There are many ways in which this may happen. Parliamentary, nation-wide democracy is said to be one, constitutional guarantees for basic human rights is also one. However, the stand taken here will be that an assembly [which can be dissolved very easily] or a constitution [which can be violated equally easily] are insufficient to stem the powers of coercion of the PMP complex. There is the state as organization, a state that in addition organizes goods and services and promulgates ideology. For that state not to be repressive it has to be balanced by something more than assemblies and words. It has to be balanced by another structure of some solidity, and there has even to be some built in contradiction, even antagonism between the structures for them to balance each other in such a way that people can get some latitude, some space in-between.

There seem to be two possibilities here; one coming out of liberal theory but actually much more from social democratic practise, and one coming out of federalist theory and practise.

The first is the idea of having capital balance the state. It is a very old and very bourgeois idea, and by state is then usually meant only the PMP part, not the B&I part. But if the state is taken in a somewhat broader sense as also implying planning and execution for a range of goods and services, then we are in the social democrat part of the development space. It cannot be quite by chance that those welfare states in Northwestern Europe (and some Commonwealth countries highly inspired by them) are both mixed economies and quite democratic in the usual sense of that term. Of course it works both ways: because of a democratic tradition

one group or even class cannot impose itself completely on the other. Compromises have to be worked out in order to provide a basis for a consensus that makes it possible to play the democratic game further. On the other hand, with state and capital both well rooted and in constant quarrel and conflicts [usually minor ones, otherwise there would not have been that much consensus] there is some space for people. But if the two are harmonized, like they are in Japan, the thesis would be that it becomes very difficult for people to be even heard, leaving alone having the last word. The crust is too thick, the burden too heavy. And this may also to some extent be the case in France and in Switzerland with high levels of elite-integration across state-capital dividing lines or watersheds: in France through les grandes écoles, in Switzerland through the military [where people meet repeatedly, two weeks repetition each year for twenty years after basic service of two months - -] - not that different from Japan with the strong cohesiveness in a university class of graduates who rise in a rather parallel fashion wherever they are in Japanese society (B or C or I; or P or M or P for that matter] because of the principles of life long employment and promotion by seniority.

The second is the idea of balancing the national level with the local level. However, this will never work unless the local units can cooperate; if they are fragmented away from each other the central, national level has an easy play. The idea would be to counterbalance the national level with an association of local levels - like positing Beijing against an association of 70.000 People's Communes! Different angles give different perspectives to articulate, again making it possible for people to become the arbiters of key structural conflicts- It is difficult to organize public opinion, to conscientize and mobilize - the structures are at work all the time and the key people in them work full time, a public rally or manifestation is an event, not a "permanent!"

One might now add a third possibility: a totally green [dark green] society where there is direct democracy in all local units because they are sufficiently small, and that is it. But is this a society, or just a set of local units? For it to become a society some central element is needed, call it a national level or whatever, and the thesis is that it is not enough that each local level is democratic [in the sense that the authorities are fully accountable to the people and can be recalled]. The local levels must also be able to act together, otherwise they would be too easy prey, one by one, for central powers.

But then there is the fourth possibility, that of having the local unit as a society in its own right! After all, the classical European state was very often a mini-state - there are still some remnants of that system [such as Andorra, San Marino, Lichtenstein]. This would be a solution provided they do not become too easy prey to bigger fish in the global waters. In other words, it may only be a solution if it is not only a local but also a global solution.

According to this way of thinking the potentially least repressive society would be one with both balance mechanisms at work: state balances capital, and national level in balance with local level. One may think of Switzerland, but that is hardly correct: state and capital work too well together, and the cantons are too fragmented. Hence, even in the country of very frequent referenda it may be very difficult for the population to override a center that is too well harmonized when the people are too geographically fragmented.

Again, it is along the main diagonal in development space solutions seem to be located. The principle of balance should be added to the principle of complexity above, again focusing on the main diagonal, and particularly on the segment between green and rose, not towards the yellow as it becomes too top heavy.

3. Development: the human space.

So far so good: this is development as commonly conceived of, as social development, starting with the economic aspect of how to provide goods and services, then moving towards more political aspects, all the time with an undercurrent emphasizing the significance of cultural aspects. Imagine some good region has been defined in this development space. Is there any guarantee that what is good for social development is also good for human development? We know that a formation on the bi-diagonal and beyond (into "yellow space") can be very good on economic growth, whether plan or market, state or capital oriented, or both - if we accept rate of growth of the gross national product (perhaps divided by a population figure to open for an exploration of distribution possibilities) as a measure of the production of goods and services at the national level - which is what this type of development is about. But how does this relate to any reasonable conceptualization of human development?

I then conceive of human development in terms of basic human needs, that rock bottom which, if not satisfied, means that human beings are so much less than they could be, even to the point of break-down, disintegration. Human needs are, of course, time and space variant; they are not constants when made sufficiently precise, nor are - indeed - the ways of satisfying them constant - the satisfiers. But at a more general level I assume that one can recognize four classes of needs, needs for survival, well-being, identity and freedom. The first two classes are what in the literature often is referred to as deficit needs: a person has a deficit in well-being when there is insufficient food, air, water, sleep, sex, protection against the hazards of nature (this is where clothing and shelter enter), or insufficient health (morbidity) not to mention insufficient life (premature mortality - this where survival enters). The deficit has to be removed through satisfaction of

these needs that are or can be seen as more somatic, material.

But then there are the growth or development needs, more mental/spiritual, less material although there certainly also is a material basis for them, eg a rock, rock bottom level satisfaction of the material needs. Needs for identity and needs for freedom are being needs as opposed to the having needs just mentioned. There is no limits to their satisfaction. From their dissatisfaction, in the shape of alienation and repression, respectively it is not a range, like for hunger, up to a point of satisfaction. There is a ladder which can be climbed, up from the murky swamps of alienation and repression, into daylight - but that ladder just goes on and on like Jacob's ladder in the Bible, but unlike Jacob's ladder it does not even end in Paradise, in Heaven. There is no end. And there are many ladders, not just one. Moreover, much of the climbing one has to do oneself, neither pushing, nor pulling are sufficient however necessary they may be in certain stages. A person can be fed and clothed and so on, but cannot be given identity and freedom. They are aspects of the person's personality, evolving through exertion, ever more, and then even more. There is no limit to being, or at least they are far away, like in Goethe's Faust [wer immer strebend sich bemüht, den können wir erlösen] or in the buddhist vision of human growth, ending in a state of maximum entropy, nibbana.

This is not a place to explore in any depth a theory of identity and freedom. Had we lived in a less economic/material, more humanistic/spiritual era vocabularies for quick, but also deep communication would have been around - but we do not. Suffice it only to say that there are many foci with which a person can identify: self (including work products), persons in the micro space around oneself, the local space, the macro space (country with its institutions, nation with its culture), the region, the

whole world [humanity]; outer space [nature - at the levels of micro-, meso- and macro-cosm] and that which is beyond, the trans-personal and trans-natural, that with which religion, but also ideology, is concerned. There is a band of foci of identification. No person can identify with all of this, at least not to the higher levels of identification, known as unity, even union - the latter also with the connotations given it in mysticism. But one might say that if the band becomes very narrow then, however deep the identity, what has happened is actually human mal-development rather than development. And this is where freedom enters!

Under what conditions is human development most likely, even for a very wide range of conceptualizations? Two factors seem to stand out, both very relevant for development theory and practice.

First, in order to grow in being there should be neither too much deficit, nor too much excess along the deficit need dimensions. A minimum should be guaranteed, but there should also be consciousness about a maximum, about a ceiling, not only a floor. If not, too much having will stand in the way of growth in being, as pointed out by so many at all times in all places, but perhaps nowhere so clearly as by the Buddha, with the idea of the Middle Way.

Second, human development also in the sense of growth in identity and freedom probably takes place at its best in a human inner space supported and supporting a micro space of friends and family and a local space, not too distracted by the larger spaces humans have constructed at the national, regional and global levels. Close contact with nature may also be very significant. But there is a general condition of quiet which is generally better found in the small than in the big - well knowing that any family life can be very noisy, and ~~serenity~~ serenity can be found in the midst of

megalopolis hustle-bustle. There is no perfect correlation here, and yet persons who seem to have come far along such roads, if not attaining buddhahood at least attaining what one might call "personhood", and communicating what they have attained to others through acts of creation have done so living in the small, even sometimes isolated, in an unencumbered setting of neither too little, nor too much of material things.

How, then, does all this relate to the development exercise as we know it from social space, with its three power articulation dimensions: normative power expressed as the general goal of BWL, remunerative power expressed as the goods and services BCI can produce, and coercive power as the control, force, pain etc. that PMP can exert? The conclusions are both simple and obvious and well known, but they have to be drawn and even as often as possible. But let us first note the correspondence [not accidental] between the dimensions of power and the classes of needs: normative power defines with what to identify; remunerative power defines goods and services - certainly relevant for survival and well-being; and coercive power sets the limits to freedom.

I think there is little doubt that the strong point of the development styles seen as blue, red and yellow above is there ability, at least in the first run, to give satisfaction to the material needs for survival and [material] well-being. There is no scarcity of having for most, or at least many people in these three worlds; in fact, the system behaves as if there is, or should be, no limit to having. But as to the other two needs classes the picture is negative. Normative power is exercised so as to legitimize the BCI complex at work with its termite like production mania, demanding identification with the goals of the highly materialistic BWL to the exclusion of other concerns if they are at variance with that goal pattern. More than that: there are also ideas or values of competition, rationality and discipline, all defined

at the level of the nation, inculcated in people[in social democracy this means both belief in the rationality of some competition and the belief in competitive rationality - quite complex actually as is to be expected from a developmental position in the middle of development space]. But this means a general dislocation of the identification foci towards private level consumption and BCI compatible production - in short human maldevelopment by the position taken above. And if on top of that there is repression exercised by the PMP complex, not permitting the freedom of variation, to seek other ways of life, alternatives, with more possibility for reflection, deepening, identity to the point of unity [like today in most red and many blue societies], then the maldevelopment gets frozen and becomes a more lasting pattern.

So the conclusion is definitely that development in the social space takes place at the expense of considerable maldevelopment in human space. If by development we mean the blue and the red styles or worlds. This is less so in societies sufficiently pluralistic to permit alternative thinking and even alternative practise, at least up to a certain point, and here one might again look at the social democracies of Northwestern Europe (and some Commonwealth countries). If alternative movements, green waves etc. are particularly pronounced there it is not necessarily because they are more needed there than elsewhere, but because they are more possible there than in the more purist, less complex, less balanced, blue and red societies. And there is no argument that any society will have persons so strong, in material and/or spiritual power, that they can escape from the standard norms and attain levels of identity and freedom unheard of for others.

But by and large the best known development styles are travesties of human development because of the way having overshadows being, and because of the general patterns of alienation and repression. If the human space were primordial, social space would have followed suit. But the opposite seems to be the case.

4. Development: the world space

Let us now try the same exercise for the world space, simply asking the question: what are the consequences of the various styles of development for the world space, the space of governments [states], but also of nongovernments [international nongovernmental organizations, profit and non-profit]. This is both a more easy and a more difficult exercise; easy because the consequences of this tremendous accumulation of normative, remunerative and coercive power in the hands of the ruling elites [BCI, PMP] of the states are so obvious, difficult because there is so little explicit thinking about what a developed world space would look like. In a sense this is both strange and obvious: strange because it should be so tremendously significant and also tempting as an intellectual exercise; obvious because recognition of the world as a system with possible development dimensions is recent, at any rate more recent than the recognition of the society as such a system which again is more recent than the recognition of human beings as systems with such dimensions - of human growth. and in the absence of thinking many people become prey to the easiest type of analysis, reductionist analysis, failing to see the sui generis nature of these spaces. According to such views a developed society is a set of developed human beings, and a developed world a set of developed societies. One also hears, but that would be from the commissar rather than from the yogi just referred, reducing everything to human growth: a developed human being is what comes out of a developed society - for instance a socialist society. One never hears, however, that a developed society is the product of a developed world for the very simple reason that no such concept seems to have emerged.

About a maldeveloped world, however, we know a lot. Again the three power aspects are useful. If the world should consist of only one society then one could, of course, apply the ana-

lysis of section 2 above, with due regard to what is said in section 3. In that world politics would be Weltinnenpolitik (von Weizsäcker) and my conclusion would be in favor of the area between the green and the blue and the red, with a high level of both complexity and balance.

But we do not live in that world; we live in a world of governments and nongovernments, as mentioned. In that world the governments have enormous quantities of means of coercion, of destructive power - two of them, the superpowers, even having enormous quantities of superweapons. Intergovernmental cooperation takes the form of alliances and pacts, magnifying the amount of means of destruction at the disposal of one actor - meaning a system of countries with a relatively harmonized goal and strategy. It is a clear consequence of the developmental strategies referred to as blue, red and yellow above that there should be this concentration of destructive power, partly because the developmental styles are centralizing, partly because they presuppose coercion both for their inception, growth and stabilization.

In the world in which we live, moreover, both governments and nongovernments operate not only national economic cycles in general and markets in particular, but transnational cycles and markets, spun around the world, but always in such a way that they divide the world in an internal sector where some consideration is given to other people's needs and an external sector where there is no (or much less) such consideration and rather catch as catch can. In both blue and red development styles this division applies inside the countries, in state socialist countries perhaps more to the nonmaterial needs (but also to the material), in private capitalist countries perhaps more to the material (but also to the non-material). The blue style, in addition, presupposes a large external sector in the outside world - that is why they had colonialism and are clinging to neo-colonialism. In order to obtain this

blue governments may very well cooperate and together constitute an internal sector which would then be intergovernmental [if in addition it is social democrat it might include most of the participant countries where their population is concerned].

In the world in which we live, furthermore, the general ethos becomes dominated by the dominant ethos of the dominant elites in the dominant countries. Concretely, this means a general world ideology with the materialism of the bourgeois way of life at its center, easily the most popular [in the sense of number of adherents] ideology in human history. At the social level three elements had to be added to this: competition, rationality and discipline. But it does not quite work like that at the world level. Competition there certainly is, leading to military races and economic races, to efforts to obtain military balance and economic balance [zones of influence, quotas, rules of the game, etc.], and when this does not succeed, ultimately to military wars and economic wars, increasingly devastating with higher levels of military technology in particular and production technology in general. In the social space such phenomena, by no means unknown, could be tempered by the combination of rationality and discipline. But in the world space both seem to be curiously absent: the tragedy of the commons is enacted in world space rather than in social space and is, of course, an exercise in lack of both rationality and discipline. Which all serve to prove one thing: some kind of world central authority is necessary, commanding either, thereby regulating competition among governments and nongovernments and based on both of these as well as on the world population directly. Something between the United Nations, as we know it, and world government of strong states as we - indeed - also know it.

So again we are led to the same conclusion: the primacy given to the social space leads to human maldevelopment and also to world maldevelopment - to the pauperization of those in the exter-

nal sectors of the center countries [these external sectors may even be overlapping] but also quite possibly to a war of considerable mutual annihilation. Both problems, poverty and war, are increasing, not decreasing every day and because of, not in spite of, this type of development. The assumption has been that world space has been like nature, something that can be littered with any kind of object, something that can stand any amount of accumulation, on a few hands, of power, military and economic and ideological.

5. Conclusion: the mess we are in.

We are in a mess, entirely of our own creation. The primacy given to the social space has been at the expense of human and world development, and the primacy given to the production of material goods and services has been at the expense of due consideration given to the spiritual need for identity and freedom, with primitive, clumsy attempts at steering people through values and institutions that in practise become both alienating and repressive. The good thing about development is the effort, that there is this idea of pushing societies, deliberately, in certain directions. The bad thing about it is the direction.

So development has to be rethought, to say the least - and thousands, millions of people [rather than their leaders] already do so. No clear trajectories in the development space of Figure 2 are emerging; there are doubts, and to some extent resignation all over, particularly as the old idols, blue and red developmental styles, become unmasked because of their consequences in all three spaces [if we add a space no. 4, nature, it all becomes even worse, as is well known]. This will not be done here, only some few indications in the Appendix of a normative development model. What can be said here is only one thing: a clear distinction should be made between "development" as modernization and nation-building, and "true" development, which may be what people do all over the world in defense against "development".

THE GPID(L) NORMATIVE MODEL: GOALS OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

- sustainable satisfaction and development of basic human needs (neither under-, nor over-consumption of "satisfiers"), facilitating or at least not impeding the human development of others
- a) survival needs
(negation: violence) - for realization of potential biological life-space unhampered by direct and structural violence
- b) wellbeing needs
(negation: misery) - for food, clothes, shelter, health care, education, "comfort", transportation/communication; for energy, etc.
- c) identity needs
(negation: alienation) - for closeness to self and others, society, culture and nature
- d) Freedom needs
(negation: repression) - for the possibility of choice, and for a conscious choice

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

- person-made environment compatible with human development
- e) Production - in a broad sense (formal, informal; goods, services) with priority of production for the satisfaction of basic human needs,
- f) Distribution - so that priority is given to those most in need, building social justice and increasing equality among nations, classes, races, sex, age and ethnic groups.
- g) Institutions - building institutions for the enactment of these goals, avoiding excessive ~~ex~~ecutorialism and giantism
- h) Structure - building, through participation, self-reliance at the local, national and regional levels, thereby also preventing that development is at the expense of others today or in the future (synchronic and diachronic solidarity) - such "development" being called exploitation; building equity at all levels
- i) Culture - doing all this in a way compatible with those aspects of the endogenous culture that are compatible with the above.
- j) Nature - maintaining and building ecological equilibria so as to prevent depletion and pollution, on a sustainable basis.

By "social development", then, is meant all social spaces: local, national, regional, global. What is said above applies, mutatis mutandis, too all levels. One might also talk about WORLD DEVELOPMENT as the environment compatible with social development, "social" then referring to the "lower" levels.

The present paper gives a brief description of some of the basic assumptions in a world model coming out of the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project, the GPID Project. Where the present author is concerned that project came out of research done at the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research at the University of Oslo in the period 1972-1977, in the Trends in Western Civilization Program and the World Indicators Program. Continuation of that research was then for a period supported by the United Nations University, Tokyo. I am indebted to the many colleagues in the GPID Project for good discussions, to the Institut Universitaire d'Etudes du Développement, Genève, and to Dietrich Fischer in particular.

For some publications by the present author from the GPID Project, all in one way or the other feeding into the GPID model, see:

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